Pakistan Can’t Replace Iran’s Role In The North-South Transport Corridor

Geopolitical factors unfortunately make this proposal a pipedream.

One of the greatest consequences of the Third Gulf War is the de facto suspension of the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC). This megaproject connects Russia and India via Iran (through branch corridors across Azerbaijan, the Caspian, and Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan) as well as India with Afghanistan and Central Asia via Iran too. This kaleidoscope of connectivity accelerates multipolar processes across Eurasia, thus making the NSTC an incredibly important part of the emerging world order.

That’s why its de facto suspension can be considered a blow to all the above stakeholders. It’s within this context that Sputnik recently raised awareness on its primary X account of the proposal by two Pakistani experts, Co-Founder and CEO of Mishal Pakistan Amir Jahangir and former high commissioner of Pakistan to India Abdul Basit, for their country to serve as an alternative to Iran. While it’s a sound idea on the surface for simple geo-economic reasons, geopolitical factors unfortunately make it a pipedream.

For starters, Pakistan has terrible relations with Afghanistan and India, the first of whom it’s presently fighting against in what its Defense Minister described as an “open war” and the second is its historical rival with whom it most recently clashed last spring. Neither accordingly has any significant trade ties with Pakistan right now, but even if Afghan-Pakistani ties improved (perhaps through Russia’s mediation), then Pakistan still couldn’t replace Iran’s role in the NSTC unless its ties with India also improved.

Considering how unlikely that is due to their polar opposite approaches towards resolving the frozen Kashmir Conflict, then whatever corridor would be created between Russia and Pakistan in that scenario wouldn’t be a variation of the NSTC but something else entirely since India is the NSTC’s second anchor. This resultant Central Eurasian Corridor (CEC) also wouldn’t be as viable as its proponents might expect due to the broader region’s evolving geopolitics that’ll now be touched upon.

The most obvious obstacle would be the likely resumption of Afghan-Pakistani clashes stemming from their unresolved security dilemma, which can be oversimplified as Pakistan’s opposition to Afghanistan’s refusal to recognize the Durand Line and Afghanistan’s dislike of Pakistan’s close US ties. This segues into the fact that Pakistan is also the US’ “Major Non-NATO Ally”, so it’s unlikely to defy US pressure not to significantly expand relations with Russia, especially not under its pro-US de facto military dictatorship.

Pakistan might also weaponize its role as the CEC’s anchor to blackmail Russia at the US’ behest. Even if it doesn’t and ties with Afghanistan remain stable, then it can’t be ruled out that some Central Asian Republics could do the same at US ally Turkiye’s behest, which is poised to comprehensively expand its influence across the region via the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”. Kazakhstan already plans to produce NATO-standard shells so it can no longer be entirely relied upon by Russia.

None of this is to imply that Russia shouldn’t try to pioneer the CEC as a replacement to the NSTC if the latter remains indefinitely suspended since it’s better than having no corridor to the Indian Ocean at all, but just that Pakistan can’t replace Iran’s role in the NSTC, and the CEC isn’t as dependable as the NSTC. A better solution is for Russia to focus on the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor since it connects with many more countries along the way than the CEC does and their economies are much stronger too.