South Asia security review
“Open War”
At the time of writing, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have escalated dramatically, with Afghanistan reportedly firing at Pakistani jets over Kabul after explosions and gunfire shook the capital on March 1, 2026. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that “air defence attacks were carried out in Kabul against Pakistani aircraft,” while urging residents not to be alarmed. Earlier in the day, the police headquarters of Parwan Province – where Bagram Airbase is located – reported that Pakistani military jets had entered Afghan airspace at around 5 am [AST] and attempted to bomb Bagram Airbase. Afghan forces reportedly responded using anti-aircraft and missile defence systems, claiming they had thwarted the attack.
These developments represent the most recent phase in an escalating confrontation between the two neighbours, which has now been openly described by Pakistani officials as “open war.” Although the Afghanistan – Pakistan border has long remained volatile, the latest escalation can be traced to February 22, 2026, when Pakistan conducted airstrikes targeting purported camps belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliates inside Afghan territory. Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar stated that the military had conducted “intelligence-based, selective operations” against seven such camps. According to Pakistani claims, at least 70 militants were killed in the strikes.
Pakistan maintained that its operations targeted “camps and hideouts” linked to militant groups responsible for a series of attacks inside Pakistan. Afghanistan’s authorities and the United Nations, however, asserted that civilians were among those killed. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported receiving credible accounts that the strikes killed at least 13 civilians and injured another seven in the Behsud and Khogyani districts of Nangarhar Province. Afghan officials gave even higher figures. Mawlawi Fazl Rahman Fayyaz, the provincial director of the Afghan Red Crescent Society in Nangarhar, claimed that 18 civilians had been killed. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence stated that the attacks struck “various civilian areas” in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces, including homes and a religious school, calling the strikes a violation of Afghan sovereignty and airspace.
Zabihullah Mujahid strongly condemned the bombardment, asserting that civilians had been deliberately targeted and that homes had been destroyed in what he described as a “criminal act.”
Afghanistan’s response followed swiftly. On February 26, 2026, at around 8 pm [AST], Afghan forces launched cross-border attacks on Pakistani military positions. Kabul described the operation as retaliation for the earlier Pakistani airstrikes. Mujahid announced that “large-scale offensive operations” had been initiated against Pakistani military installations along the Durand Line, accusing Pakistan’s military leadership of repeated provocations and violations of Afghan territory.
Pakistan countered within hours. On February 27, Pakistani forces carried out strikes on Kabul as well as in the provinces of Paktia and Kandahar. The same day, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif declared that Islamabad’s “cup of patience has overflowed,” adding that the conflict had now reached the stage of “open war” between the two countries.
Casualty claims from both sides varied widely and could not be independently verified. Afghanistan’s Defence Ministry claimed that 55 Pakistani soldiers had been killed in the February 26 clashes and that Afghan forces had destroyed 19 Pakistani army posts and two bases. The Ministry also claimed that several Pakistani soldiers had been captured alive. Afghan authorities acknowledged that eight Afghan soldiers had been killed and 11 wounded in the clashes.
Pakistan offered sharply different figures. According to Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, the February 27 strikes killed 133 Afghan Taliban officials and wounded more than 200. The Pakistani Prime Minister’s spokesperson for foreign media, Mosharraf Zaidi, later claimed that 297 Afghan fighters had been killed and more than 450 injured. He also asserted that Pakistani forces had destroyed 89 Afghan posts, captured 18 soldiers, and destroyed 135 tanks and armoured personnel carriers while targeting 29 locations across Afghanistan from the air.
The rapid escalation followed the breakdown of fragile diplomatic arrangements that had been put in place months earlier. In October 2025, the two countries had reached a truce mediated by foreign actors, after a series of violent clashes along the Durand Line. Despite the agreement, tensions never fully subsided, and sporadic incidents continued to strain relations.
During the October 2025 crisis, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul targeting a vehicle allegedly linked to TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. The strike reportedly hit a crowded civilian market instead, killing at least 15 non-combatants. Further Pakistani air operations targeted the Bermal District of Paktika Province, destroying at least 10 shops. The Taliban condemned these attacks as unprecedented violations of Afghan sovereignty and warned that Pakistan would be responsible for any escalation. On October 11, Taliban forces launched retaliatory operations against multiple Pakistani military posts along the border. The following day, Mujahid claimed that Taliban fighters had seized 25 Pakistani outposts, killing 58 soldiers and wounding 35, while Taliban casualties were limited to nine fatalities. Pakistan’s military offered a conflicting narrative, asserting that it had neutralised over 200 Taliban fighters and TTP operatives while dismantling 21 Afghan positions and several militant training camps. Islamabad confirmed the deaths of 23 Pakistani personnel and injuries to another 29.
International mediation temporarily halted the fighting. Saudi Arabia and Qatar intervened diplomatically, leading to a ceasefire agreement on October 15, which was extended two days later. Nevertheless, violations continued. Pakistani forces fired mortar rounds into Spin Boldak in Kandahar and Dand Patan in Paktia, killing one civilian and injuring four. Airstrikes in Kabul’s Taimani area killed five people and injured 35. Civilian casualties mounted as the clashes continued. The UNAMA reported that at least 37 civilians had been killed and 425 wounded during the week-long escalation across several provinces, including Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, Khost, Kandahar, and Helmand. The violence represented one of the most serious confrontations between the two countries since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Further incidents intensified public anger in Afghanistan. On October 18, Pakistani airstrikes in Paktika Province killed eight people, including three club cricketers who had gathered after a match. The episode provoked widespread outrage and led the Afghanistan Cricket Board to withdraw from a planned triangular T20 series with Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Diplomatic efforts resumed shortly afterward. On October 18, Taliban Defence Minister Mohammad Yaqoob travelled to Doha for negotiations with Pakistani representatives following the clashes. The talks eventually produced a ceasefire agreement on October 19, mediated by Qatar and Turkey. Both sides pledged to refrain from hostile actions and from supporting armed groups targeting the other. The agreement also envisaged a mechanism for addressing disputes through dialogue. Follow-up negotiations took place in Istanbul, beginning October 25. Pakistan demanded written assurances that TTP would not launch attacks from Afghan territory and called for the extradition or neutralisation of TTP leaders. Afghan representatives insisted that TTP was Pakistan’s internal problem and denied that the group operated from Afghan soil. Kabul also demanded guarantees that Pakistan would respect Afghan airspace and act against Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) elements operating from Pakistani territory.
The talks soon reached a stalemate. Afghan negotiators proposed the creation of a four-party monitoring mechanism involving Qatar and Turkey to oversee ceasefire compliance and intelligence sharing. Pakistani negotiators presented evidence they claimed demonstrated the presence of militants with Afghan identity documents. According to reports, the Taliban delegation offered no response to the evidence. Subsequent rounds of negotiations in Istanbul failed to produce any breakthrough. A brief ceasefire violation occurred at the Chaman-Spin Boldak crossing during the third round of talks in early November (November 7), further eroding trust between the two sides. Both governments blamed each other for initiating the firing.
Meanwhile, rhetoric on both sides grew increasingly confrontational. Pakistan issued a 72-hour ultimatum demanding that the Taliban summon the TTP leadership or face unilateral action. Taliban representatives warned that any Pakistani attack would provoke retaliation and cautioned that Islamabad itself would not remain safe. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif escalated the rhetoric further, declaring that Pakistan would enter into “open war” if negotiations failed.
In the aftermath of the failed talks, Pakistan intensified its counter-insurgency campaign under Operation Azm-e-Istehkam and notified the United Nations of plans to forcibly repatriate 1.7 million Afghan refugees by December 2025. The Taliban, in response, deployed additional forces along the Durand Line and issued a religious decree describing Pakistan’s actions as justification for jihad.
The escalation also drew international attention. United States (US) President Donald Trump commented publicly on the crisis, stating that he “gets along very well” with Pakistan and expressed respect for its prime minister and military leadership. US officials echoed this position. Allison Hooker, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said she had spoken with Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch to express condolences for lives lost in the conflict and reaffirmed US support for Pakistan’s right to defend itself against Taliban attacks.
Afghan leaders, however, condemned Pakistan’s actions in strong terms. Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani stated that Afghans were “ashamed” of Pakistan’s conduct and warned that a nationwide uprising could prove extremely costly if provoked.
Pakistani officials responded by accusing the Taliban government of supporting militant groups and suppressing the rights of Afghan citizens. Information Minister Attaullah Tarar described the Afghan regime as illegitimate and alleged that it was fully aligned with terrorists responsible for attacks inside Pakistan.
Beyond conventional military clashes, new forms of warfare have begun to appear. Pakistani authorities reported that drones had been launched toward several cities, including Abbottabad, Swabi and Nowshera. The drones were reportedly intercepted before causing casualties, but the incidents underscored the expanding scope of the conflict.
For the moment, the confrontation between Afghanistan and Pakistan appears to be entering a dangerous new phase. The collapse of diplomatic efforts, coupled with retaliatory military operations and increasingly hostile rhetoric, has created a volatile environment along the Durand Line. What began as a dispute over militant sanctuaries and cross-border attacks has now escalated into a direct military confrontation between the two neighbouring states.
With both sides mobilising forces and exchanging strikes across the border, the risk of a wider conflict remains high. The events of late February and early March 2026 suggest that the fragile balance that once contained tensions between Kabul and Islamabad has now broken down, pushing the two countries to the brink of sustained open warfare.
Political consolidation
On February 17, 2026, Tarique Rahman took the oath as Prime Minister (PM) of Bangladesh, as Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP-alliance won 212 seats out of 297 declared seats in Jatiya Sangsad. After the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, and the uninterrupted mayhem and violence of 18 months under Mohammad Yunus’ Interim Government, Bangladesh saw an elected Prime Minister.
Within few days, Rahman has brought sweeping changes in the leadership of the military, intelligence, Police, and civil administration in two major reshuffles, on February 22 and again on February 26. The scale, speed, and institutional spread of the reshuffles point to a deliberate attempt to reconfigure the state’s power architecture after a major political transition. The most significant changes were in the Army Command, and included the Chief of General Staff, Principal Staff officer and Division Commanders; the Chief of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI); the top Police leadership, including the Inspector General of Police and the Commissioner of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police; the Governor of Bangladesh Bank, the country’s central bank; and various Secretaries, including the Secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office, among others.
These are the core instruments of state power. The appointment of a new DGFI chief and reshuffling of operational commands suggests an effort to secure regime loyalty and control over intelligence flows. There are indications that officers perceived as aligned with previous regimes or foreign linkages are being replaced. One report explicitly noted that an officer was removed due to “perceived close ties with Pakistan.” Simultaneously, “Yunus-era” appointees have reportedly been sidelined, reflecting political consolidation. The reshuffles may also be partly intended to insulate security agencies and the administration from ideological penetration by radical Islamist formation, particularly including the Jamaat e Islami (JeI), not the largest party in opposition.
Significantly, following the reshuffles, both JeI and Islami Andolan Bangladesh (IAB) fiercely criticised the government. On February 26, JeI Chief, Rahman stated that the situation created at Bangladesh Bank seems to be the “formal beginning of a government-backed mob culture”, calling it unfortunate and completely unacceptable. Likewise, on February 26, IAB Joint Secretary General and Spokesperson Gazi Ataur Rahman stated, “The financial sector was pushed into chaos by appointing such a person as governor.”
Earlier, on February 23, JeI Secretary General, Mia Golam Porwar, criticised the BNP-led Government for appointing party-affiliated individuals as administrators to six city corporations. Porwar protested the decision, noting that a notification issued on February 22, by the Local Government Division, named administrators for Dhaka North City Corporation, Dhaka South City Corporation, Khulna City Corporation, Sylhet City Corporation, Narayanganj City Corporation and Gazipur City Corporation.
As discussed with the writer, experts and academics from Bangladesh, [on condition of anonymity] have sketched out some possibilities with respect to these transfers. First, Rahman is trying to consolidate his political position as Prime Minister and also secure BNP’s political standing amidst strong presence of Jamaat and its cohorts. Secondly, he is trying to root out elements with Jamaat backing or its sympathisers from important positions. Thirdly, because a sizable portion of BNP supporters are also sympathetic to the Jamaat and its ideology, (JeI is an old ally of BNP, and had earlier backed BNP-led coalitions in 1991 and 2001), not much analytical discussions are occurring in the public domain regarding these transfers and shuffles. Fourthly, with the absence of Awami League from the political landscape, Rahman remains very cautious, since his return to the country, he is constantly criticized and targeted by Islamists, especially JeI and IAB leaders. He seeks to avoid constant political combat with these organisations. Moreover, Rahman’s priority is to maintain a basic level of peace and curb the violence that has become commonplace since Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Within this context, experts believe that the coming six months to one year will be a crucial period for Bangladesh’s democracy and also for Tarique Rahman.
Significantly, pre-election violence, principally clashes between BNP and JeI, signal dangers lurking over his party leaders and members. Since the declaration of the election date on December 11, 2025, according to partial data collated by Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), six BNP members were killed and 77 injured (data till February 28, 2026) in such clashes. Among the dead were:
On December 17, BNP leader, Biru Mollah, President of the Lokhmikunda Union unit, was shot dead by unidentified assailants inside his residence in Ishwardi Upazila (Sub-District) of Pabna District.
On January 3, unknown assailants shot dead BNP leader Alamgir Hossain in the Shankarpur area of Jashore town in Jashore District. He was joint secretary of Jashore Municipality BNP’s Ward No. 7 unit.
On January 5, a local leader of Jatiyatabadi Jubo Dal (JD), the youth wing of BNP, Jane Alam Sikder, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in Purba Gujra Union of Raozan Upazila in Chattogram District.
On January 7, Azizur Rahman aka Musabbir, former General Secretary of the Dhaka Metropolitan North branch of the Swechchhasebak Dal, BNP’s volunteer wing, was shot dead by unidentified miscreants in the Tejturi Bazar area of Tejgaon in Dhaka city.
On January 24, Hasan Molla, General Secretary of the Hazratpur Union BNP, died after being shot by motorcycle-borne assailants in Dhalikandi area of Keraniganj Upazila in Dhaka District.
On February 16, the body of Joynal Abedin Dhali, a local BNP worker, was recovered hanging from a tree in Gosairhat Upazila of Shariatpur District.
In his first weeks in Government, Rahman has given clear evidence of a systematic consolidation of state power, particularly focused on its coercive apparatus. Internationally, there are suggestions that he is seeking to reduce alignment with any single power, and is moving towards strategic autonomy and balance. These strategies are likely to yield stabilisation through control of institutions in the short run, though, in the longer term, they may risk politicisation and internal friction.
Bangladesh remains politically and economically fragile, and the challenges facing the Rahman Government will persist. Nevertheless, the early days of the regime have seen a measure of calm and deliberate action that have the potential of steadying the chaotic trajectory that the country has followed over the recent past.