The Fatemiyoun Brigade – Iran’s Instrument Of Foreign Policy And The Afghan Taliban’s Hope For Iranian…
Introduction
In recent decades, the nature of regional conflicts has shifted from direct warfare to proxy conflicts, with states increasingly pursuing their strategic objectives through the use of non-state armed groups. The Islamic Republic of Iran is among the states with extensive experience in establishing and utilizing proxy networks. The Fatemiyoun Brigade, composed largely of Afghan fighters, forms part of this network of pro-Iranian militias and was notably active in the Syrian conflict.
This article examines the organizational structure of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, its role in advancing Iran’s regional geopolitical strategy, especially its current status as well as its potential security implications for Afghanistan, which has been a safe haven for the group in the past few decades.
The Fatemiyoun Brigade is a key component of Iran’s proxy military network, formally established in 2013 amid the intensification of the Syrian civil war.[1] However, the roots of this group can be traced back to earlier periods. According to some studies, it is linked to earlier formations such as Sepah-e-Mohammad, the pro-Iran Pakistani group active in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s as well as during the Iran–Iraq War (1980-88).[2]
Fatemiyoun Brigade fighters trained by Al-Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Fatemiyoun – Its Origins And Establishment By IRGC
Following the outbreak of the Syrian war in early 2011, the the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) began reorganizing the Fatemiyoun Brigade in a more structured manner. In late-2012, as the government of Bashar Al-Assad faced significant military pressure, the presence of foreign fighters increased, including Afghan Shi’ite fighters who were members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade.[3] These fighters were trained under the leadership of the Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani and went on to play a significant role in Syria.
Afghan Shi’ites, particularly among the Hazara population, have been primarily recruited for the Fatemiyoun Brigade. The recruitment process took place among Afghan migrants in Iran, as well as Shi’ite individuals from within Afghanistan. Regarding the structure and funding of this group, a BBC Persian report says that the Fatemiyoun Brigade operates under the command of the Qods Force, noting that its fighters receive salaries in U.S. dollars and legal residency status in Iran, and a significant portion of Iran’s casualties in Syria were from this group.[4]
The recruitment of the Fatemiyoun Brigade members was not through voluntary participation, with some reports indicating that in some cases it involved coercive pressure by the IRGC. According to human rights assessments, some Afghan migrants in Iran who lacked legal documentation were confronted with three choices: imprisonment, deportation, or deployment to the Syrian war.
In addition, economic incentives played a significant role, as some sources report monthly salaries ranging from $450 to $800, along with promises of legal residency, as key factors in recruitment. This suggests that the mobilization of Fatemiyoun fighters was not purely ideological, but largely shaped by social and economic pressures, which the IRGC appears to have used as a means of mobilizing manpower.[5]
Fatemiyoun Brigade fighters whose funerals were held in Iran
The activities of the Fatemiyoun Brigade fighters in Syria were associated with high levels of casualties. Fighters from this group were frequently deployed to the most dangerous frontlines, which contributed to a sustained high casualty rate. According to statements from former Fatemiyoun Brigade members, they often perceived themselves as “expendable forces” on the battlefield, raising serious questions about the manner in which they were used by IRGC and the human cost of their deployment.[6] This suggests that the Fatemiyoun Brigade functioned not only as a military force, but also as a high-risk component within Iran’s broader war strategy.
The Fatemiyoun – An Instrument Of Iran’s Foreign Policy
As an instrument of Iran’s foreign policy, the Fatemiyoun Brigade has served as a low-cost proxy force, a tool for expanding geographic influence, and a means of ideological mobilization. Therefore, despite the decline of the Syrian conflict, this network has not been dissolved.
Approximately 2,000 to 3,000 Afghan fighters were killed in the Syrian war, around 8,000 were wounded, and dozens remain missing. Due to what has been described as the “deliberate lack of transparency by the Islamic Republic of Iran,” many families have never received information about relatives who were killed or went missing while serving within the Fatemiyoun framework.[7]
Following the reduction in the intensity of the Syrian war, Fatemiyoun fighters dispersed across multiple geographical locations, including parts of Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Since the collapse of the Assad regime, their presence has taken several forms: maintaining positions in the outskirts of Damascus and eastern Syria; returning covertly and informally to Afghanistan; working in Iran in areas linked to the IRGC; and maintaining a presence in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East.[8] According to estimates, at the time of the Assad regime’s collapse, approximately 5,000 to 10,000 Fatemiyoun fighters were present in Syria.[9]
The Fatemiyoun remains well organized but relatively inactive. Over time, it has also developed ideological and cultural dimensions. Elements associated with this network appear to be seeking to maintain their influence through cultural and social activities, thereby creating conditions for long-term mobilization.
Afghanistan – A Safe Haven For Fatemiyoun
Although the Fatemiyoun currently does not maintain a visible military presence in Afghanistan, some reports and field-based claims suggest that the country could serve as a location for the group’s network reorganization or covert presence. Ahmad, a pseudonym for a former Afghan soldier who returned from Iran, stated in an interview with the author of this article: “Members of the Fatemiyoun who are affiliated with the IRGC are still present in several provinces, including the capital Kabul, as well as Herat, Balkh, Wardak, and Bamyan…”
Similarly, a local source from Jalrez district in Wardak province claims: “Those Fatemiyoun members who had fought in Syria a few years ago have now returned to their home areas…” Such claims suggest that the human network of the Fatemiyoun may remain informally active within Afghanistan. Furthermore, some analyses indicate that limited Fatemiyoun-related networks may exist in certain areas of Afghanistan, including Kabul, Hazarajat, and northern provinces.[10]
Afghan Shi’ites hailed as “martyrs” after being killed in Syria
In addition, a 2019 media report claimed that Iran has attempted to send Fatemiyoun members into Afghanistan under the guise of migrants: “Officials [of the former Afghan government] say that as the war in Syria has decreased, the Iranian regime is secretly sending members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade among migrants to Afghanistan in order to incite sectarian conflict in the country.”[11] The report adds that “a national security official [of the former Afghan government] stated that the Iranian government secretly sends a number of Fatemiyoun fighters daily, disguised as migrants, to Herat province.”[12]
Hossein Ali, a 29-year-old member of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, was arrested by Iranian police in Mashhad after years of living and working in Iran and being deployed three times to the Syrian war. Despite his affiliation with the Fatemiyoun, he was beaten and his money confiscated, and he was subsequently deported to Afghanistan through the Islam Qala border crossing; Ali now lives with his family in Herat.[13]
At the same time, in the light of Afghanistan’s current political situation and regional interactions, the issue becomes more complex. The Taliban government seeks to maintain a monopoly over the use of force and to prevent the emergence of parallel armed groups. However, its engagement with regional countries, particularly Iran, continues. In May 2025, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi led a delegation to Iran, where emphasis was placed on strengthening bilateral ties.[14] Similar contacts have always taken place between the Taliban leaders before and after they came to power in August 2021.
Amid War With Pakistan, Afghan Taliban Seek Iran’s Military Aid
Within this context, these interactions between the Taliban and Iranian leaders may not be purely political but could also have security and intelligence dimensions. In particular, given the recent tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is growing discussion that the Taliban may be seeking regional cooperation to enhance their defensive military capabilities. One possible scenario is that if the Taliban seek military or technical support, Iran could leverage this situation to advance its strategic interests.
For example, some analysts suggest that, in exchange for such cooperation, Iran may attempt to secure a limited and informal presence or a safe operating environment for its proxy network Fatemiyoun, in Afghanistan, particularly in border areas. Although formal military relations between the Taliban and Iran have not been publicly confirmed, some claims point to the possibility of indirect engagement.
For instance, a former CIA officer alleged that on March 28, 2026, the head of intelligence of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, General Majid Khadami, attended a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan, with a number of individuals who were described as “terrorists.”[15] In addition, border control in Afghanistan is still not considered fully effective or consolidated, a condition that increases the likelihood of movement by armed actors and informal networks, more so following the U.S. and Israeli war on Iran in the summer of 2026.
The Fatemiyoun Brigade’s activities are not limited to visible military presence but also include covert and indirect dimensions. It is likely that Iran is seeking a low-intensity presence in Afghanistan, involving small, irregular, and limited networks tied to Fatemiyoun. Alternatively, the Taliban could allow Iran to manager connections and coordination among former members as well as recruit new fighters from Afghanistan.
These activities are typically conducted without a visible military structure, as was orchestrated and executed by Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Qods Force. Under Soleimani, Fatemiyoun members had survived as part of sleeper cells in Afghanistan. Similarly, they can be reactivated by Tehran, particularly in the event of escalating regional tensions.
These developments pose a threat to Afghanistan too. Some security concerns point to potential threats against critical infrastructure. For instance, in 2015, the then Afghan government officials “discovered explosives along with two sets of IRGC uniforms in a vehicle near the Salma Dam” – at the time Iran was “attempting to prevent the operation of the Salma Dam in Herat province…”[16] The Fatemiyoun Brigade retains its capabilities and has strong ideological moorings, and there is likelihood that Tehran can always use it even against Afghanistan.
[1] Mashreghnews.ir, August 29, 2019.
[2] Aiss.af (Afghanistan), November 15, 2018.
[3] Aiss.af (Afghanistan), November 15, 2018.
[4] BBC.com/persian, December 4, 2024.
[5] Aiss.af (Afghanistan), November 15, 2018.
[6] Iranintl.com (Iran), December 8, 2025.
[7] Iranintl.com (Iran), December 8, 2025.
[8] Iranintl.com (Iran), December 8, 2025.
[9] Independentpersian.com (Afghanistan), January 31, 2025.
[10] Aiss.af (Afghanistan), November 15, 2018.
[11] Afghanistan.asia-news.com (Afghanistan), June 11, 2019.
[12] Afghanistan.asia-news.com (Afghanistan), June 11, 2019.
[13] Afghanistan.asia-news.com (Afghanistan), August 19, 2022.
[14] Mfa.gov.af (Afghanistan), May 17, 2025.
[15] X.com, April 6, 2026.
[16] Da.azadiradio.com (Afghanistan), December 3, 2015.