Pakistan’s Military Support for the Taliban Opposition: Status and Challenges
Tensions persist between Kabul and Islamabad, accompanied by an information war, psychological pressure, and border and political clashes.
Introduction
Pakistan has long held connections with various Afghan political factions. Pakistan, over the 1960s and 1970s, progressively supported religious and political groups that were against the Afghan government, aiming to establish an opposing force to its conflicts with Kabul.
Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan, with support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, aided the Afghan Mujahideen. After the fall of the communist government and the onset of civil wars, Pakistan backed opponents of the central government, especially the Taliban.
During the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Islamabad likewise maintained ties with the Taliban. Nonetheless, following the Taliban’s re-establishment in 2021, Pakistan embraced their victory while sustaining significant reservations.
Russia and Iran are calling for the avoidance of confrontation and for dialogue between the Taliban and Pakistan
Even though some Afghan jihadi and political party leaders were present in Pakistan in the summer of 2021, the divide between the two sides remained wide. Consequently, Islamabad refrained from directly supporting or hosting opponents of the Taliban.
Over the past five years, Islamabad has repeatedly urged Kabul to stop armed groups from using Afghan soil to launch attacks inside Pakistan. But the Taliban accuses Pakistan of dishonesty and of shirking its own domestic challenges.
Aside from 15 Pakistani air and drone strikes on Afghanistan during the past year, Pakistan has recently reported the downing of eight drones attributed to the Taliban administration.
Taliban’s Approach
On 17 July, a newly formed group named “Sepahian-e Mihan” temporarily took over the governor’s office, police command, and the Taliban intelligence office in Badakhshan.
From 23 to 25 July, clashes took place in the Zebak district of northeastern Afghanistan, close to the Pakistani border, with multi-pronged attacks targeting Taliban military bases, border outposts, and checkpoints.
In recent months, Taliban-affiliated media have reported airstrikes targeting positions of opposition groups, including the “Freedom Front,” in the “Shah Salim” area of “Chitral” district, Pakistan. According to these reports, “the Afghanistan Freedom Front” used them to plan and coordinate operations inside Afghanistan.
Some Taliban officials in Badakhshan allege that Pakistan has set up safe havens and training centers for armed anti-Taliban opposition in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa state.
From the Taliban’s perspective, the assailants had entered Afghanistan through the “Shah Salim” route and from Pakistan’s “Chitral” district. Even Qari Fasihuddin, the Taliban’s army chief of staff, referred to the attackers as having crossed over from the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.
Indeed, Kabul accuses Pakistan of hosting a large number of anti-Taliban opposition figures and organizing and inciting them to fight against the Taliban.
Even some inside Afghanistan claim that Pakistani military forces accompanied and took part in the armed opposition’s attacks in Badakhshan province. In this context, Kabul has previously held discussions regarding the creation of safe havens and training centers for opposition figures in Pakistan.
Current Situation
Beyond statements by certain former Pakistani officials regarding Pakistan’s openness to anti-Taliban groups, Pakistan has established contacts with anti-Taliban figures in the past two years. There are even rumors that an opposition military office is present in Pakistan.
Beyond the meetings Pakistani officials held with anti-Taliban figures, opposition groups, and Afghan ethnic parties over the past three years, hosting Taliban opponents last autumn marked a significant turning point in Islamabad’s approach.
Amrullah Saleh recently stated that Pakistan has entered a new phase in its policy toward Afghanistan and the Taliban administration, while simultaneously pursuing several pressure tracks.
From this perspective, Pakistan is consulting with anti-Taliban forces on Afghanistan’s political future and seeks to lay the groundwork for a post-Taliban political order.
Badakhshan borders Pakistan, Tajikistan, and China. Given its historical, geographical, and geopolitical position, its socio-political, cultural, and demographic background, and the growth of anti-Taliban activities up to 2026, Badakhshan offers a serious opportunity for a substantial political and military presence of the opposition.
However, Pakistan has rejected the presence of its military personnel in Badakhshan.
Undoubtedly, Islamabad also views the Taliban opposition as a tool for containing Taliban threats, an opportunity for bargaining, and a means of preserving strategic influence, curbing India’s influence, and maintaining “strategic depth.”
During the past six months, several groups abruptly joined the anti-Taliban military fronts. If this trend is viewed as a product of escalating tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan, then undoubtedly one of the pressure levers on the Taliban could be the utilization of the potential of Afghan opposition military personnel and immigrants in Pakistan.
Challenges
Over the past few decades, Pakistan has repeatedly attempted to leverage Afghanistan’s internal fissures, migrant communities, and armed groups to gain influence over Kabul.
However, the Taliban holds the upper hand thanks to its manpower, experience, military equipment, capacity for weapon repair and refurbishment, access to drones, control over territory and security, rapid troop mobility, a sophisticated and extensive intelligence network, and its ability to manage internal structural divisions.
The anti-Taliban opposition suffers from numerous weaknesses and problems, including military weakness and a lack of cohesion among its various fronts. Internal Taliban opponents and disgruntled commanders are also removed or sidelined.
Opponents of the Taliban government have limited trust in Islamabad, and prominent anti-Taliban figures are still suspicious of Pakistan. As the prominent opposition leader Atta Muhammad Noor declared, “Cooperation with others is a betrayal of Afghanistan.”
The international community’s inclination to avoid destabilizing Afghanistan is significant.
At the international and regional levels, the Taliban has acquired a form of relative legitimacy through practical engagement with China, Russia, Iran, India, Europe, Central Asian states, Turkey, and Arab countries.
In addition, Russia and Iran are calling for the avoidance of confrontation and for dialogue between the Taliban and Pakistan. Many have also prioritized positive engagement with the Taliban government and not providing practical support to the opposition.
A distinction exists between “attack” and “the ability to retain territory.” Waging war requires funding, weapons, ammunition, shelters, communications, training, intelligence, and movement routes.
All-out support for the Taliban’s military opponents carries financial costs, and Pakistan alone cannot shoulder this burden. Washington’s approach to Afghanistan likewise still does not extend to practical and military support for the anti-Taliban opposition.
Future Scenarios
Although some, including Amrullah Saleh, have recently stated that Afghanistan is now in a “civil war,” the armed anti-Taliban opposition has so far failed to present a major challenge to the Taliban. However, they can play a role for Islamabad as a means of containing the Taliban.
Additionally, Pakistan can play a more important role in pressuring Kabul by extending multifaceted support to the military opposition within Afghanistan, such as intelligence collection, fomenting local discontent, limited operations, or generating insecurity across Afghan provinces.
Limited aid and the provision of any more sophisticated weaponry to the Taliban opposition could result in the onset of another round of proxy warfare between the two neighboring states.
Pakistan’s current support appears to be more punitive in nature toward the Taliban. Its future policy is also likely to combine direct engagement with the Taliban and selective use of the opposition.
However, Islamabad’s policy of expanding ties with the Taliban opposition appears not to have been substantially operationalized yet. Undoubtedly, if tensions between Kabul and Islamabad escalate more sharply, the crisis will enter a more dangerous stage.
Thus, the outcome of the proxy war can be found in the future political dynamics between Kabul and Islamabad.
In the more probable scenario, given the Taliban’s tactical and security edge, the status quo will persist. However, if Taliban–Pakistan relations move toward wider and unprecedented tensions, the pattern of unrest in Badakhshan could become more pervasive and evolve into a front comprising Afghan political and military opposition. This could also be considered a proxy war.
In other words, if Islamabad contemplates the option of regime change in Afghanistan, it could trigger a new wave of civil war there.