Hindu Nationalism: A Century-Long Path to Political Dominance

Hindu nationalism is a political doctrine holding that Hindu identity coincides with Indian national identity. This is its fundamental distinction from the “geographical” nationalism of the Indian National Congress. The preconditions for the emergence of Hindu nationalism appeared at the turn of the twentieth century, but it took definitive shape in the 1920s and 1930s as a response to the strengthening of the Muslim League.

The principal ideologue of this movement was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. In his youth, he took part in anti-British terrorist groups, and after his release in 1922, he joined the small party Hindu Mahasabha (“Great Assembly of Hindus”), where he set about developing the ideology of the new movement. Savarkar’s 1923 book Hindutva (“Hinduness”) presented the history of the Hindu nation as an unbroken struggle against a Muslim threat. In Savarkar’s view, this threat was existential in nature. The Congress, and especially its leaders—Gandhi and Nehru—were accused of appeasing Muslims and betraying Hindu interests. In addition, a characteristic feature of the ideology was criticism of the parliamentary system typical of the interwar period.

Under Savarkar’s leadership, the party remained a fairly marginal political force throughout the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time, another organisation operated in parallel—the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, “National Volunteer Corps”), a paramilitary association with a rigid hierarchy. Its role increased sharply in 1947 during the Partition of British India. For Indian society, Partition became the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century; however, in the eyes of the right, the leaders of the Congress were to blame. An important support base for right-wing movements was formed by Hindu refugees from Pakistan, who, for obvious reasons, were deeply hostile towards Jawaharlal Nehru’s government.

The growth of Hindu right-wing influence was seriously undermined by the assassination of Gandhi, carried out by Nathuram Godse on 30 January 1948. Although Godse was not a member of either the RSS or the Hindu Mahasabha at the time of the attack, he belonged to the broader right-wing camp, and his actions placed it under severe pressure. Hindu nationalist organisations were banned, and thousands of activists were imprisoned. Nehru’s government lifted these bans only after right-wing leaders recognised the Constitution adopted in 1950 and accepted the multi-confessional character of the Indian state.

Ahead of the first parliamentary elections, some right-wing politicians decided to reorganise the Hindu Mahasabha. With the support of RSS leader Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, a new party was created—the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS, “Indian People’s Union”). In the first elections, the party received only 3% of the vote, and over the next twenty-five years, its support never exceeded 10%. This was due both to the aftermath of Gandhi’s assassination and to the near-total control exercised by the Congress over the electoral system, as well as its close integration with the local bureaucratic apparatus.

Throughout the 1950s–1970s, the right, like the communists on the opposite flank of the political spectrum, remained an uncompromising opposition with no real chance of coming to power at the national level. External observers during this period did not regard them as a serious force, seeing the main threat to Nehru’s authority either in the left or in intra-party opposition within the Congress itself.

Nevertheless, prolonged time in opposition strengthened the right-wing camp. Its foundation became the long-term alliance between the BJS and the RSS. RSS activists, accustomed to strict discipline and unquestioning obedience to the “Supreme Leader” Golwalkar, formed the backbone of the party apparatus. In addition to parliamentary activity, the right worked across a wide range of spheres: they cooperated with trade unions and student organisations, and in 1964 established the Vishva Hindu Parishad (“World Hindu Council”) to work with Hindu communities both within India and abroad.

In foreign policy, the right adopted sharply anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese positions, supported Tibetan independence, and refused to recognise Pakistan. Domestically, they opposed Nehru’s “socialist” course.

The emergence of Hindu nationalists from political isolation occurred in the mid-1970s, when a broad opposition coalition was formed under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan, uniting the BJS, socialists, and former Congress members. After Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency in 1975, the activities of right-wing organisations, like most other opposition forces, were banned. However, despite the arrest of their leaders, right-wing structures continued to operate underground. The period from 1975 to 1977 became an important stage in the formation of the political identity of Narendra Modi’s generation—those born in the 1950s who entered politics in the 1970s.

Political Economy of Connectivity

As Indian foreign policy thought seeks to avoid the term “soft power”, it instead proposes a vision of “cultural diplomacy”—de-emphasising the very notion of “power” in its approach to diplomatic outreach. Instead, the concept of mutual understanding and coequal dialogue is what comes to shape Indian public diplomacy and cultural influence efforts, writes Elena Remizova, Head of the Rossotrudnichestvo Representative Office in India.

Opinions

After the lifting of the emergency, Hindu nationalists entered government for the first time as part of a broad anti-Congress coalition. Former BJS leaders Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani became ministers in Morarji Desai’s government. This government quickly demonstrated its ineffectiveness, allowing Indira Gandhi to return to power. Nevertheless, it was at the turn of the 1970s–1980s that the Congress monopoly on power was first broken.

The modern stage in the history of Hindu nationalism begins in 1980. The BJS, having absorbed fragments of several allied anti-Congress parties, was transformed into a new political force—the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, “Indian People’s Party”). The change of name reflected an attempt to move beyond its traditional right-wing electorate—upper-caste Hindus from the Hindi-speaking belt.

This was especially important in the context of the transformation of India’s political system in the 1980s. The “one-and-a-half party” model, based on Congress dominance, rapidly gave way to a multiparty system.

Urbanisation, rising literacy, and the spread of new means of communication—above all television—drew the population increasingly into politics. Hindu nationalists were evolving from a marginal force into one of the principal parties laying claim to the Congress legacy.

The struggle of the 1980s–1990s was waged on two fronts simultaneously. On the one hand, the Hindu right needed to convince political elites and external observers of its respectability, presenting itself as a kind of analogue to Western conservatives and as reliable economic partners if it were to gain power. To this end, rhetoric about the BJP’s commitment to secularism was intensified, and attempts were made to engage even with the Muslim community.

On the other hand, there was “hard Hindutva”—the mobilisation of the electorate under religious slogans. Its most famous example was the campaign to build a temple to Rama in Ayodhya on the site of the Babri Mosque. The contradictions between Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who embodied “soft Hindutva”, and the leader of “hard Hindutva”, Lal Krishna Advani, were largely superficial: the two principal leaders of Hindu nationalism were simply working with different audiences.

The BJP’s rise to power in 1998 was made possible by two factors. First, the party significantly expanded its electorate, securing around 20% of the vote and moving well beyond its traditional support base. Second, the BJP demonstrated exceptional political flexibility, managing to conclude coalition agreements with strengthened regional parties.

The ascent of the Hindu right to power after half a century in opposition caused far less upheaval than many experts had expected. In economic policy, the BJP’s neoliberal course differed little from that pursued by Congress governments since the 1990s. In foreign policy, the anti-communist stance of Hindu nationalists also lost much of its former relevance after 1991. In 2004, the BJP lost the elections and ceded power to the Congress, once again demonstrating its commitment to the parliamentary system.

The first decade and a half of the twenty-first century became a period of India’s two-party system. At both national and regional levels, centre-right and centre-left coalitions alternated in power, led respectively by the BJP and the Indian National Congress. This system appeared relatively stable; however, the 2014 elections and the formation of Narendra Modi’s cabinet effectively brought it to an end.

The 2010s showed that Hindu nationalism was far more successful in adapting to contemporary challenges than India’s various “secular” political movements. This became particularly evident during the 2014 election campaign, when Narendra Modi used social media for mobilisation to maximum effect. The BJP secured a historic victory, became the country’s dominant political force, and has maintained this position ever since.

The BJP—as a party uniting Hindu nationalists—may appear to an external observer as a monolithic force. In practice, however, a wide variety of groups exist within the movement. The core of Hindu nationalism consists of individuals drawn from the RSS, often connected to the movement across more than one generation. At the same time, the party includes a large number of “fellow travellers”—politicians who have joined the BJP over the past twenty-five to thirty years. Many of them began their careers in other parties. This is particularly characteristic of the Dravidian-speaking states, the North-East, and other regions where the right has only recently begun to gain strength.

Above all these groups stands the figure of Narendra Modi, who, thanks to his personal popularity, has succeeded in attracting a new electorate. Modi communicates directly with voters, largely bypassing the party apparatus. This distinguishes him from the previous generation of right-wing leaders, above all Vajpayee, while at the same time bringing him closer to politicians such as Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines.

The “cult of personality” surrounding Modi is a phenomenon uncharacteristic of the right-wing movement of previous decades. Previously, BJP leaders occupied more of a “first among equals” position and were required to coordinate their actions with the RSS leadership. With the BJP’s rise to power, the party has become far more leader-centric—and this may ultimately threaten party unity when the question arises of choosing a successor to the seventy-five-year-old Indian Prime Minister.

Eurasian Perspective

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in 2026 is defined by systemic fragmentation and compound crises. The overt diplomatic rupture between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), running concurrently with the US-Israeli military intervention in Iran, designated ‘Operation Epic Fury’, has dismantled historical alliances and disrupted global energy markets. For the Republic of India, the Middle East is not merely a peripheral theater but a vital geoeconomic lifeline.