A Nation Under Siege: Russia-Ukraine War Destabilizes Kazakhstan’s Economy As Russian Media Splits The Kazakh Ethnos Apart – Analysis

Key Takeaways:
Russian analysts, notably Nikita Mendkovich, warn that Western and Ukrainian actions—including potential drone threats to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium—are aimed at destabilizing Kazakhstan as a means of pressuring Russia, with speculation of a possible coup attempt by 2026–2027.
Western Kazakhstan holds critical strategic value due to its role in the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), energy export infrastructure, and access to the Caspian Sea, making it a focal point of competition between Russia and external actors seeking to bypass Russian territory.
Moscow views growing Western, Turkish, and NATO-linked influence in the region as an existential threat that could isolate Russia from its southern flank, prompting intensified concerns and narratives about separatism or security risks in the oil-rich western provinces.
An article titled The Kyiv-Washington Plan: How the West is Trying to ‘Shake Up’ Russia via Kazakhstan features insights from Nikita Mendkovich, Head of the Eurasian Analytical Club, regarding the potential consequences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ drone attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and the Kazakh economy. According to the Russian political expert, since Kyiv and Washington “are failing to destabilize Russia, they are shaking up neighboring Kazakhstan to target Moscow through it, aiming to orchestrate a coup within 2026-2027”.

He noted that “NATO has a forward operating base in the region via Turkey and Azerbaijan, offering highly practical operational range for its air force”.

“This forms a highly logical blueprint for orchestrating a coup in Kazakhstan during 2026, or 2027 at the absolute latest. Let me remind you that back in 2022, under a calmer political climate, the mutiny was suppressed only with the assistance of CSTO troops”, Nikita Mendkovich concluded.

His closing comment functions more as a warning than a trip down memory lane. Be that as it may, given the lessons of the past, his words should not be lightly brushed aside. What exactly is this about?

Ukraina.ru, in an article entitled Flirting with nationalists can lead to the collapse of the Kazakh [ruling] power and published on December 9, 2021, quoted Nikita Mendkovich as saying: “If the draft law [legislative amendments on visual information, which reinforce the use of the Kazakh language in advertising and signage] is rejected, it will mean that the authorities have realized the problem and are trying to solve it… If the [Kazakh] government continues to pander to extremists and neo-Nazis, we can talk about a threat to the [Kazakh] government itself. All of this might mean that the issues of foreign and domestic policy of Kazakhstan will be dealt with not by Tokayev and the current generation of elites, but by someone else”. On December 29, President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev signed those legislative amendments. At the very beginning of the New Year, 2022, there was an attempt to overturn the system of government in Kazakhstan, according to official reports…

Nikita Mendkovich, who accurately predicted the turmoil that loomed over the Central Asian country at the very end of 2021, is now once again issuing warnings that can hardly be interpreted as anything other than a portent of serious trouble. The issue here is not who this Russian political expert is pointing his finger at, but rather that he is, just as in 2021, predicting major upheavals for Kazakhstan.

He is, of course, referring primarily to Western Kazakhstan. This is because the pipeline carrying Kazakhstan’s export oil – an attack on which would worsen the republic’s budget deficit – originates in this very region.

In a broader sense, the geopolitical significance of Western Kazakhstan rests on three critical factors.

The Geography of the ‘Middle Corridor’ (TITR): The route passing through the ports of Aktau and Kuryk toward Baku (Azerbaijan) represents the shortest path connecting China and Central Asia to Europe. Without this segment, the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea remains effectively blocked.

Energy Independence: Kazakhstan’s primary export capacities for oil and gas are heavily concentrated in this very area. The development of the Trans-Caspian pipeline or the expansion of oil shipments via tanker fleets can only be realized through the ports located in the country’s western region.

Connectivity with Regional Neighbors: For Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, securing access to the Caspian Sea through Kazakh territory is the sole method to diversify their logistics and bypass reliance on northern or southern routes.

From Moscow’s perspective, the geo-strategic importance of Western Kazakhstan stems from the fact that it represents one of Russia’s most sensitive post-Soviet border regions. Its significance in this regard is primarily dictated by its tight coupling with the national security and economy of the Russian Federation.

Moscow fears that the increasingly heavy traffic along transport routes passing through Western Kazakhstan to bypass Russia – stretching from China and other Central Asian nations to Europe via the Caspian and the Caucasus – could be transformed into an instrument of economic isolation against Russia. It has every reason for such concern. Western nations and international institutions openly view the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) as a strategic alternative to Russian corridors, specifically designed to help reduce global trade dependency on Russian infrastructure.

However, Moscow finds something else to be far more critical. In its eyes, Western Kazakhstan serves as a sort of ‘lock’ on the Caspian. Any attempt by extra-regional players to establish a foothold in Aktau or Atyrau is perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its national security. How is the current situation assessed over there regarding this issue? The Kremlin has so far refrained from commenting on it. Meanwhile, Russian media and political experts are already sounding the alarm. Back in 2023, Alexander Kobrinsky, Director of the Agency for Ethno-National Strategies, stated: “No matter what anyone says, Kazakhstan is moving under the NATO umbrella. In the defense sector, the republic cooperates with NATO member Turkey… The North Atlantic Alliance is entering the Caspian via Kazakhstan… Furthermore, the alliance will control transport routes running from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian, and beyond”.

Journalist Viktoria Lushkina, in her article titled Turkey Wants to ‘Take’ Kazakhstan Away from Russia published by Inkazan, asserts the following: “The latter [external forces] are attempting to sever Russian-Kazakh ties with the help of Turkey… Turkey is paying closer attention to this because Russia’s southern neighbor serves as a kind of ‘bridge’ between pro-Turkish countries and regions of the Russian Federation with Turkic-speaking populations. Consequently, how Ankara acts inside Russia depends on whether Kazakhstan succumbs to Turkish influence… But we should also consider another interested party in ‘separating’ Kazakhstan from Russia – namely, NATO countries and the United States in particular. Turkey is a member of the alliance and supports the organization’s expansion into Central Asia, serving as a ‘bridge’ between its regions and the alliance”. The outlet Novaya Khakassia believes that if the federal center – that is, official Moscow – does not decide to pay more attention to Turkey’s attempts to ‘take under its wing’ certain regions of Russia, it could lead to severe consequences. Here, a key point must be noted. Turkey can extend its influence to RF regions with Turkic-speaking populations, as Viktoria Lushkina pointed out, primarily through Kazakhstan. Yet, this NATO member state shares no borders with either Russia or its Central Asian neighbor. For all intents and purposes, it can only ‘enter’ Kazakhstan through its western region.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has significantly weakened, allowing the United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey to strengthen their positions in Armenia and Azerbaijan substantially. A new reality is currently taking shape there. Armenia is becoming a platform for a direct U.S. logistical presence, while Azerbaijan has emerged as a key hub oriented toward the Turkish-EU axis, actively backed by American capital. Meanwhile, Turkey acts not merely as a partner, but as the guarantor of this new reality, providing a military and political ‘umbrella’ for the Caspian-EU continuum. Under these conditions, Russia is effectively transformed from the ‘master of the crossroads’ into a ‘neighbor behind the fence’ – able to observe the flows but lacking the leverage to halt or tax them. Consequently, Moscow will now likely attempt to prevent Western countries and Turkey from entering and establishing a foothold on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea as aggressively as they did in the South Caucasus. There is, in fact, nothing new about such assumptions.

Alnur Musayev, the former chairman of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee (KNB), previously claimed in an interview with Ukrainian media that the Kremlin allegedly possesses a military invasion plan for Kazakhstan aimed at cutting the country off from the Caspian Sea. According to him, the plan entails establishing control over the Caspian coastline from Russia’s Astrakhan to Kazakhstan’s Aktau, and further down to the border with Turkmenistan. Its objective is to isolate Kazakhstan from maritime routes and the strategic resources of the Caspian, while securing a ‘bonus prize’ in the form of the country’s western region.

Granted, within expert circles, this statement by Alnur Musayev is perceived more as the radical personal opinion of an exiled opposition politician rather than a reflection of actual military plans backed by objective data. Yet, what can really be said here? Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the prevailing view among the expert community was also that such a scenario was highly improbable. Expert skepticism was anchored in a series of common-sense arguments that ultimately proved wrong due to an underestimation of the Kremlin’s willingness to take risks. Could history be repeating itself in this instance?!

Those observers inclined to dismiss Musayev’s remarks point to three specific factors to back up their skepticism. First is the fact that relations between Moscow and Astana are characterized by both sides as a strategic alliance, and they reportedly continue to strengthen cooperation across all key sectors, despite external pressure and Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. However, for three decades after gaining independence, Armenia was also a key strategic ally of Russia, right up until it began reorienting toward the West, freezing its participation in the CSTO while maintaining economic ties. Despite diversifying its security policy, this South Caucasian republic’s economic dependence on the Russian market remains exceptionally high. Russia’s share in Armenia’s export structure stands at 35-40%, whereas for Kazakhstan, it is 10-12%. This means the Armenians’ dependence on the Russian market is roughly four times higher than that of the Kazakhs. On the flip side, the EU’s share in Armenia’s export structure was 4.7%, while for Kazakhstan, it was around 45%. In other words, the Armenians’ dependence on the European Union market is nearly ten times lower than that of the Kazakhs.

The second of the three aforementioned factors is that Russia must act with extreme caution in Western Kazakhstan, as excessive pressure could supposedly accelerate the development of the Trans-Caspian route (the Middle Corridor) bypassing the Russian Federation – a route actively lobbied for by the EU and Turkey. Such an assertion appears inherently contradictory. This acceleration is occurring, and will continue to occur, regardless of whether Russia exercises caution or not. In fact, this is already happening amidst what is virtually total inaction on Russia’s part. Further delay clearly risks a repetition of what transpired in the South Caucasus for Moscow. Consequently, at this stage, greater caution is highly unlikely to alter the momentum of the process under consideration.

And the third factor is that Russia cannot offer the technologies for deepwater drilling at Kashagan that the likes of ExxonMobil, Shell, or Total possess, and that China is showing an intense interest in the Middle Corridor. Thus, the argument goes, Moscow simply cannot afford to ignore these circumstances. All of this is true. However, both these Western corporations and China cannot fail to realize that, following the events in the South Caucasus, Moscow simply cannot help but view similar activity by interested parties in Western Kazakhstan as an attempt to establish an ‘anti-Russian platform’ and redraw the regional logistical map to effectively ‘cut off’ Russia from the entire southern flank of the post-Soviet space.

In the eyes of the Russian expert community, the latter poses an existential threat. For Russia, being ‘cut off from the south’ does not merely signify a loss of influence, but its transformation into an ‘island’ locked away in the north. Furthermore, one cannot discount the fact that, in analyzing the geopolitical landscape as of early 2026, some experts directly link the Russian Federation’s ongoing loss of its positions in the South Caucasus and, especially, Central Asia to acute risks for its own domestic stability.

If one overlays this geostrategic dynamic within Russia’s near abroad onto the socio-economic situation currently unfolding inside the country itself, an extremely alarming picture emerges—one that demands extraordinary and prompt decisions from the country’s leadership. In January 2026, the Russian Federation’s oil and gas revenues amounted to 393.3 billion rubles, which is nearly half of what was recorded in January 2025. Moscow-based expert Vladimir Lepekhin, in an interview with pravda.ru, stated that Russia faces an economic collapse by the end of 2026 due to accumulated critical imbalances, the archaization of the economy, and its heavy reliance on raw material exports. Furthermore, the Russian newspaper Novye Izvestia published a piece under the telling headline: “Russia’s Economy Is Still Holding On by Inertia, But It Is Already Rolling into the Abyss. Is a Crisis Looming?”.

Against this backdrop, if Russian experts are to be believed, the West has already traversed its half of the path leading to a direct clash of military-political interests between Russia and NATO on the eastern (Kazakh) shore of the Caspian. As Alexander Kobrinsky noted: “The North Atlantic Alliance is entering the Caspian via Kazakhstan… Furthermore, the alliance will control transport routes running from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian, and beyond”. One only needs to look at the sheer volume of statements made within the Russian expert community throughout 2025 regarding the threat posed by the Ukrainians and their Western backers allegedly utilizing the airspace and territory of Western Kazakhstan to conduct drone attacks on cities in the Volga region and the Southern Urals. Russian military experts claimed that flight paths for Ukrainian drones through Kazakhstan’s Caspian littoral are being mapped out based on Western satellite intelligence data. Fears were also voiced in Russia that Ukrainian intelligence services could exploit an extensive network of assets inside Kazakhstan to infiltrate and launch small drones directly from Kazakh territory.

As the saying goes, what the Kremlin has on its mind, Moscow’s political analysts have on their tongues. Furthermore, there is a prevailing consensus among observers: if several different experts begin speaking in unison about the exact same “new threat” or “necessary measure,” it almost always indicates that a corresponding draft policy is already sitting on a desk in the halls of Russian power, awaiting a signature. Is it permissible, then, to assume that this very document could be the Kremlin’s plan for a military invasion of Western Kazakhstan—aimed at cutting the country off from the Caspian Sea from the Russian port of Astrakhan to the border of Turkmenistan – which former KNB Chairman Alnur Musayev claims exists?

Some observers tend to see China as the ultimate counterweight, one that would allegedly ensure the Kremlin is held back from such radical actions. The argument goes that a Russia blocking the Western Kazakh shore of the Caspian would effectively cut off the trade route from East Asia to Europe bypassing the Russian Federation, a move that Beijing would allegedly take issue with. Well, what can really be said here? Should Russians act in the manner predicted by Alnur Musayev, they are highly unlikely to actually cut off this route. It would be sufficient for Moscow simply to bring it under its own control. The notion that Russia’s interests in Western Kazakhstan will inevitably clash with those of China – on the ground Beijing serves as the Russian Federation’s strategic rear guard and primary economic partner, thereby acting as an insurance policy against radical Russian actions there – appears highly simplistic and stereotypical. Does anyone honestly think China would welcome a potential NATO presence in Western Kazakhstan? Furthermore, on what basis can it be assumed that China fails to appreciate the danger of the situation in which Russia would find itself under such a turn of events, or that it would refuse to acquiesce to Moscow’s desire to act in defense of its interests, should such a need arise? In cases like the one under consideration, a consensus between them could be reached through a mutual recognition of the need to adhere to a regional security concept where the sovereignty of smaller nations is secondary to preventing the entry of ‘extra-regional players’.

The history of the struggle over transit corridors from Central Asia serves as a textbook example of the “Great Game” played out in a modern setting. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this region has become an arena where two fundamentally disparate logistical concepts collide. Russia’s strategy focused on maintaining existing pipelines and laying new ones that pass directly through Russian territory—such as the CPC oil pipeline running from Kazakhstan to Novorossiyk—which granted Moscow vital political and economic leverage. Conversely, the Western strategy was anchored in the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) international transport program launched by the EU in 1993, alongside the BTC oil pipeline project, which was brought fully online in 2006 by a consortium of the same name. Both of these Western-backed initiatives encountered severe difficulties in reaching their original design capacities, due in no small part to intense geopolitical competition from Russia.

During its first decade, the TRACECA project, although not technically ‘abandoned’, remained more of a declaration of intent than a functioning transport artery. As for the BTC pipeline, in 2025- roughly twenty years after its commissioning – it transported 27.18 million tons of oil, which is nearly half (at approximately 54%) of its design capacity of 50 million tons. It was originally engineered with the expectation of transporting not only Azerbaijani hydrocarbons but also large volumes of oil from Kazakh fields. The possibility of expanding its throughput capacity to 60 million tons or more has been discussed since its launch. Today, however, the situation is a matter of sheer survival rather than expansion. The fact that the pipeline remains “half-empty” represents the lesser part of the problem. The greater part stems from the inevitable, projected increase in underutilization in the near term. Production at the ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli) fields—the primary source of oil for the BTC—peaked back in 2010, and output volumes have been declining annually ever since. In the short term (2026–2027), the BTC is expected to remain a significantly underutilized asset. Its primary value is widely seen as having shifted from a purely commercial dimension to a strategic one; it is now perceived as a guarantor of European energy security and a vital alternative outlet for Central Asia. Even so, major efforts remain underway to broaden the base of the BTC’s commercial viability. In this regard, the options are extremely limited. Today, just as it was before 2010, when production at the ACG block had only just passed its peak, the primary efforts to enhance the commercial viability of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline focus on attracting significant volumes of transit oil from Kazakhstan. Ultimately, the commercial prospects of the BTC depend directly on whether it receives a Kazakh ‘lifeline’.

At the end of 2024, Kazakhstan’s then-Minister of Energy, Almasadam Satkaliev, announced ambitious plans to potentially scale up oil shipments via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route from 1.5 million tons to 20 million tons. It is argued that if volumes from the Tengiz field are redirected to the BTC en masse, it would bring the pipeline’s utilization up to 70–75%, drastically improving its profitability. Furthermore, reports indicate that the Kazakh government and BTC shareholders are discussing the possibility of connecting oil from the giant Kashagan field to the pipeline. Here, it is worth recalling that the CPC pipeline, which runs through Russian territory, was originally constructed precisely as the primary export route to deliver Tengiz oil to global markets. If Tengiz volumes shift to the BTC on a massive scale, it will mean a substantial reduction in Russia’s revenues from the transit of Kazakh oil. Such prospects are hardly a source of delight for Moscow.

To scale the supply of Kazakh hydrocarbons via the BTC to 20 million tons, the construction of the Eskene-Kuryk pipeline across Kazakh territory is an absolute necessity. This project, designed to connect the Bolashak Onshore Processing Facility (Kashagan) with terminals on the Caspian Sea, is a fundamental prerequisite for transforming the BTC from a mere “emergency exit” for Kazakhstan into a powerful commercial channel. The initiative originated back in 2008 in anticipation of the upcoming production peak at Azerbaijan’s ACG block and was envisioned as part of a broader strategy known as the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS). It was during that time, in November, that KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR signed an agreement on the principles of implementing this project. It is widely understood that the project was shelved due to repeated delays in launching production at Kashagan, coupled with the successful capacity expansion of the CPC pipeline, which proved to be economically more viable at the time.

The construction project for the Eskene–Kuryk oil pipeline was incorporated into the Mid-Term Plan for Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2008–2010. The commencement of the actual construction of the Eskene–Kuryk trunk pipeline was scheduled for 2010. According to calculations at the time, the first phase of the pipeline, with a capacity ranging from 23 to 56 million tons per year, was expected to secure an export route bypassing Russian pipelines. The feasibility study evaluated options to expand the throughput capacity from 56 to 80 million tons per year. Subsequently, work progressed on the feasibility study (FS) and memorandums with contractors. At the plenary session of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit held in Istanbul on December 20–21, 2010, Kazakhstan’s then-Prime Minister stated that the country would soon implement a project to establish the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) to feed oil into the BTC. It was reported at the time that the KCTS, which includes the Eskene–Kuryk oil pipeline, was scheduled to become operational by 2013–2014.

In 2011, there were protests in Zhanaozen, a city in Mangystau province located less than 100 km away from the port of Kuryk, “at a scale not seen before in Kazakhstan’s modern history”. And then, on December 16, 2011, what Wikipedia considers the ‘Zhanaozen massacre’ happened. A little over a year later, on February 28, 2013, Lenta.ru, a Russian media outlet, published an article entitled “The Junior Zhuz: Will a new State appear on the shores of the Caspian Sea?”. It said: “[Russian] experts constantly draw attention to the main strategic prerequisite for the crisis in Mangystau – the desire of a certain part of Western Kazakhstan elites to secede from Astana, seeking to get an autonomy status, or even to go so far as to proclaim an independent State on the shores of the Caspian Sea”. The project of the Kazakhstan Caspian Oil Transportation System (KCTS), as far as can be judged, was then put on the shelf.

“The Junior Zhuz: Will a new State appear on the shores of the Caspian Sea?” was a long article written with great knowledge of the matter. Before it was published, no one had ever said anything like that publicly to the Kazakh audience. The piece had an explosive effect on thewidest circles of the Kazakh public, particularly since it had been published by Lenta.ru, a Moscow media outlet, ranked 5th in traffic among European news sites in all languages in 2013. There is an explanation for this. Here is what Lenta.ru told its readers in this regard: “Kazakhstan absolutely does not control more than half of the television network and almost the entire book market, not to mention the Internet. The information environment [in the Central Asian country] now is quite friendly to the authorities of Kazakhstan solely thanks to the support of Moscow, which protects the republican elites”. If the above is to be believed, it turns out that in terms of information security, the authorities of Kazakhstan depend entirely on ‘the support of Moscow, which protects the republican elites’.

Abai.kz, a popular Kazakhstani media outlet, said as follows about the Lenta.ru piece: “In the said article,… the political technology style of specialized institutions, perhaps even special services, can be traced. Is that the case?”. Aidos Sarym, a Kazakh political expert, who is said to be a member of the Berish tribe of the Junior Zhuz, answered the question. He said: “Certainly. It would be naive to believe that the publication of Peter Bologov’s article was merely an accidental one”. Aidos Sarym then began to prove that “Western [Kazakh] separatism” is utter nonsense.

Be that as it may, since that time, under conditions where “representatives of the Caspian region are extremely poorly represented in central government bodies compared to natives of other provinces” and “the region’s indigenous inhabitants sit atop oil and gas treasures and feed half the country, yet receive only crumbs from the budget table”, Russia, in the broadest sense of the word, has begun to act from a position entirely new to it. This stance has consisted, and continues to consist, of fueling the discontent of the people in oil-rich Western Kazakhstan regarding their plight and nurturing their “rightful resentment toward their fellow citizens in less oil-endowed, yet generally more affluent regions”. Furthermore, it involves promoting a narrative of an ethnic origin and historical past for them that is fundamentally distinct from that of the rest of the state-forming Kazakh nation.

This is obviously where the answer lies as to why Russian historians and ethnographers are—right now, three hundred years later – returning to the recognition and acceptance of the indigenous population of Western Kazakhstan primarily as the direct descendants of the historical Nogais. It explains why they are beginning to clearly segregate them as ‘their own’ (viewing them, as Nogai descendants, as ancient indigenous inhabitants even within the Russian regions of the Southern Urals and Siberia alongside the Bashkirs and Siberian Tatars) while classifying the rest of the Kazakhs as ‘outsiders’ (treating the latter as an ethnic group that migrated to those regions later, in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, ‘from Central Kazakhstan under the pressure of the Dzungar invasion’).

But when exactly did this shift begin to manifest, and at what stage in the modern history of Russian-Kazakh relations did it start to become noticeable? Well, consider the facts for yourself.

On May 31, 2001, V. Trepavlov, who was at the time Russia’s leading expert on the history of the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia, published an article in the newspaper Rossiyskie Vesti titled Was Kazakhstan a Russian and Soviet Colony? In it, he argued that the West Kazakhs (representatives of the Junior Zhuz) first began appearing in the vicinity of the Yaik (Ural) River after migrating from somewhere further south, ‘fleeing from the Dzungars’. Prior to that, according to him, ‘this region served as the homeland of the Nogais, Kalmyks, and Ural (Yaik) Cossacks’.

In other words, from the 1730s all the way through the 2010s, the dominant historical narrative in Russia maintained that the Kazakhs of the Junior Zhuz only arrived in the Ural River basin and the current Kazakh sector of the Southern Urals by the early 18th century. Before that time, the region was considered the land of the Nogais – a people with whom the West Kazakhs were viewed as having no direct connection.

Yet, since 2015, contemporary Russian historians such as A. Rybalko and I. Atnagulov began to construct and establish the notion that – at least until the late 17th century – the Kazakhs of the Junior Zhuz were bound by a shared historical destiny not with the rest of the Kazakhs, but with the Bashkirs, the indigenous people of the Southern Urals. According to these scholars, the Junior Zhuz Kazakhs living there at the time were actually of Nogai descent. In other words, contemporary Russian historiography equates the Kazakhs of the Junior Zhuz with the Nogais, thereby considering them indigenous inhabitants of not only the Kazakh but even the Russian sectors of the Ural River basin and the broader Southern Urals region.

It would seem that academic science and realpolitik are rarely intertwined when it comes to the pressing issues of the modern day. This is because the former typically seeks out fundamental causes and long-term patterns, whereas the latter is tightly held in the grip of immediate, short-term expediency. Yet, they do share common ground. Politicians frequently exploit scientific findings not in a quest for truth, but to legitimize pragmatic decisions that have already been made. The gulf between them narrows particularly during times of crisis, when old, pragmatic frameworks cease to function, forcing those in power to turn to academic research in order to construct a new map of reality.